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The  Drury Report is an excellent survey of problems of 
political development in the north. Since its publication in 
1980, a number of events have underscored the need for 
structuring a new governmental process in the N.W.T. 
The Lancaster Sound  Regional Report, continuing discus- 
sions  with  Inuit over the Nunavut proposal, the pending 
environmental assessment of the Beaufort, the  Dene-Metis 
proposal for “Denendeh,” passage of the Canada Act, Bill 
C-48 and the April 1982 plebiscite  on  political  division in 
the N.W.T. all indicate an urgency for action. Indeed, 
given the unchecked power of the federal government  in 
the region, further delays in political development may 
mean northerners are disadvantaged in resolving  issues 
surrounding the above events. A review of the Drury 
suggestions is  timely in order to determine how  well they 
actually address problems faced by people in the north. 
The central issue facing residents in the N.W.T.  is, as 
Mr.  Drury (1980:29) puts it,  an “inability to control their 
own affairs.” Most of these people have always lived 
under  the direct tutelage of Ottawa. Many  depend  on  the 
Department of Indian  and Northern Affairs (DINA) or the 
government of the N.W.T. (GNWT) to provide food, 
clothing,  shelter,  fuel,  medical care, and  many other  services. 
With the talk of responsible government and  devolution of 
powers, it is little wonder that expectations have been 
rising.  In fact, most groups in the north are becoming quite 
vocal about gaining control of their own destiny. This 
argument, however, is  not  new. It has  been a source of 
contention for years. Diamond Jenness (1963), in  his  work 
on  administration in the north, indicated that resentment 
of government paternalism goes back to the 1920s and 
1930s. 
This control, however, is  not a simple matter. Rather it 
is  an  integral component of four other issues considered 
very  important by people in the N.W.T.  First, most  native 
people are concerned about preserving their cultural heri- 
tage - preserving traditions and values of their culture 
which they consider important. Second, they desire 
economic independence - freedom from dependence on 
Ottawa for the basic necessities of life. Third, they  want 
land - land  and control of its resources - which  is  seen as 
the key to being  able to preserve aspects of their culture 
and  gain  economic  independence.  And  finally,  they  demand 
a degree of political autonomy; it  is considered imperative 
to have  political  decision-making  power  in order to control 
their own affairs. Thus, their primary  goal  is  intricately 
linked  with cultural preservation, economic independence, 
land  claims and political development. Any assessment of 
the  Drury  Report  must  be  seen  in  the  light of these  problems. 
The Drury Report follows a decade during  which  recom- 
mendations of The Carrothers Commission (1966) were 
being implemented. The Carrothers Report, first of all, 
strongly endorsed development of responsible govern- 
ment  in the north. At the same  time  it advocated a healthy 
respect for the north’s particular cultures and  problems as 
government  institutions  and  procedures  evolved. The devel- 
opmental process began  with  moving the territorialgovern- 
ment to Yellowknife  in 1967 and the subsequent creation 
of elected representative bodies at the community,  regional 
and territorial levels. While elaborate government struc- 
tures have developed, many  people  in the north are frus- 
trated by the fact that they do not  have  political authority. 
In other words, responsible institutions exist in that repre- 
sentative bodies are elected, but Ottawa retains political 
power.  One of the interesting anomalies of the north  is  the 
emergence of an impotent political apparatus. 
This  anomaly  is underscored by the fact that a number 
of informal political organizations have emerged in the 
north. These organizations articulate the interests ofdiffer- 
ent groups  in the Territories. They include, for example, 
the Committee for Original  People’s  Entitlement (COPE), 
The Dene Nation, the Metis Association, Inuit  Tapirisat of 
Canada, hunters and trappers associations, co-operatives, 
and various advisory organizations, e.g. in education. This 
dual development - at the formal-legal and informal  lev- 
els - has politicized  many  people  in  the north. In an effort 
to control their own destiny, they  now  have the instru- 
ments  through  which they can  work to achieve this end 
and they  know  how to use them  in the political process. 
Thus, politics in the north today  have changed, and  some 
suggestions in the Drury Report are  a response to these 
changes. 
I 
Mr.  Drury  was  commissioned  in 1977 to report to the 
Government of Canada  on  a  decade of political  progress in 
the N.W.T.  and  to recommend measures to: 
- modify and improve the existing structures, institu- 
tions and systems of government; 
- extend representative, responsive and responsible 
government; 
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- transfer  or  delegate  federal  responsibilities  and  pro- 
- promote native participation in government at all 
- devolve  powers  and  responsibilities  to  the  local  level; 
- protect  native  cultural  interests  (Drury, 1980: 1). 
The  report is  interesting  in  that  like  the  Carrothers  Report, 
Mr.  Drury  is  very  aware  of  the  “uniqueness”  of  people 
and  problems in the  north.  In  this  regard,  southern  models 
are  not  always  applicable  to  the  situation: 
The Special Representative’s observations of conditions 
in the N.W.T. reinforced his conviction that a govern- 
ment structure more relevant to  the  traditions and cir- 
cumstances in the Territories was required (Drury, 
1980:2). 
grams  to  the  Government of the N.W.T.: 
levels; 
and 
After  these  opening  remarks,  it  is  surprising  that  Mr. 
Drury’s  work is not  innovative.  New  and  dynamic  changes 
are  not  advocated.  On  the  contrary,  the  report  conveys  a 
sense of  resignation  about  federal  presence in the  Territories. 
There  is  no  sense  of  urgency in the  evolution of  political 
change  and  he  offers  no  specific  model  for  this  change. 
Second,  Mr.  Drury  makes  no  explicit  recommendations 
per se. Instead,  he  offers a number  of  “conclusions”  at  the 
end of chapters 2 through 7. Interestingly,  contained in 
these  conclusions  are  some  very  sound  proposals,  such  as 
the  particular  role of government in communities.  Thus, 
Mr.  Drury  attempts  to  meld a sense of  resignation and a 
need  for  change. 
I1 
Cultural  survival,  while  not  addressed  directly  as a con- 
stitutional  problem,  nevertheless  pervades  the  rationale 
for  almost  every  suggestion  made in the  report.  Mr.  Drury 
(1980:15) summarizes  the  issue  very  well. 
The native peoples in the  N.W.T. can be thought of as 
Canadians having “special” interests. They enjoy a 
social, cultural and political uniqueness, which derives 
from their aboriginal ancestry and homeland in the 
N.W.T.,  their  cultural and economic traditions, their 
relationship to the natural environment and their politi- 
cal values. While their aboriginal ancestry has no agreed- 
upon  legal consequences in Canada, by tradition  it  carries 
a moral  and ethical dimension of considerable weight. 
The relationship of native peoples to the land  and  its 
wildlife resources is  not  only  economic but also mystical. 
Their cultural organization is  based  on the family unit 
rather than on organizational hierarchies and they tra- 
ditionally  have  been collectivist rather than  individualist. 
They are inclined to the sharing of property and mate- 
rial goods rather than to individual ownership, and to 
oral  rather than to written expression. Their political 
values may  be expressed in terms of consensus  rather 
than recorded majority vote;  a preference for delegates, 
ratherthanrepresentatives; decentralization rather than 
centralization;  a sharing of information and knowledge; 
and the rule of  man rather than the rule of law. 
The social,  cultural and political traditions and  values 
of native peoples in the N.W.T. have been evolving 
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continually in the face of changing influences and exter- 
nal exigencies, which, as with their counterparts in 
southern  Canada, has required adaptation and has, at 
times,  threatened assimilation. 
The  key  word of course  is  “assimilation.”  Indigenous 
people  have  never  subscribed  to  the  argument  that  their 
cultures  should  not  change.  Indeed,  most  realize  that  sur- 
vival  in  a  modern,  industralized  society  requires  adjust- 
ment which might be termed economic assimilation. 
However,  these  people  are  convinced of the  fact  that  their 
cultural  heritage  contains  beliefs  and  values  different  from 
those  of  other  Canadians,  and  that  some of these  cultural 
attributes  must  be  retained.  In  fact,  they  argue  that  these 
attributes  not  only will help  them in adjusting  to  an  alien 
way of  life but will assist  them in  avoiding  total  assimilation. 
As in most  cultural  groups,  the  desire  to  avoid  complete 
assimilation is crucial. There is a compelling desire to 
transmit  part  of  their  cultural  heritage  to  future  generations. 
One  means  by  which  culture  is  transmitted is via  the 
educational system. Mr. Drury recognized this and his 
“conclusions”  in  chapter 4 contain  the  following. 
Education should become a  shared jurisdiction between 
the territorial and local orders of government, with the 
local level given paramountcy in the elementary field, 
and the territorial level paramountcy in the secondary 
and post-secondary fields. This arrangement invites 
cooperation between both orders of government in all 
aspects of education and provides an opportunity to 
make educational  policy  and  administration  more  respon- 
sive to community needs. 
Because the field would  be a shared one, the GNWT 
could continue  to legislate for elementary education to 
the  extent that the communities choose not to do so. 
Community governments should have the option to 
choose and purchase  resource materials required for 
their  curricula. 
New materials produced either by the GNWT or  other 
agencies should  be approved by the community council 
before becoming part of the local curriculum. Existing 
native associations and any organizations and corpora- 
tions resulting from native claims settlements might be 
particularly well placed to provide the materials in 
question. 
In secondary and post-secondary  education, the territo- 
rial government should retain prime or ultimate respon- 
sibility for the definition, development and delivery of 
all programs. 
The GNWT  could transact suitable arrangements with 
those community councils wishing to manage their local 
secondary schools (Drury, 1980:44-45). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The proposal would create dual responsibilities in 
education.  Communities  would  be  responsible  for  early 
education (primary) where transmission of a system of 
values  is  most  important.  The  GNWT  would  be  responsi- 
ble  for  secondary  education,  where  it  may  be  more  impor- 
tant  to offer options  which  would  include  preparation  for 
living  in or  out of the  north. 
A  second  area  closely  linked  to  the  preservation  of  a 
cultural heritage is the control of land and renewable 
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resources.  Living  off  the  land  (hunting  and fishing) has 
been  an  integral  part  of  the  cultural  heritage in he  north. If 
indeed  parts of this  heritage are to be preserved,  the  oppor- 
tunity  to  hunt  and  fish  should  be  preserved. 
The link between  economics  and  cultural  preservation 
is important  for aboriginal  peoples.  Earning  wages “outside” 
the  community  may  raise  the  standard  of living and  create 
opportunity  for  northerners. Total dependence  on  outside 
employment,  however,  is  not  desirable.  Resource  indus- 
tries  and  some  types  of  work in the  public  sector  tend  to 
follow  a  boom-or-bust  pattern.  Tying  one’s  welfare  totally 
to this  type  of  employment  can  be  precarious.  Not  only  is 
it unstable,  but it can  lead  to  greater  assimilation  into  the 
white  man’s  culture.  Most  native  peoples,  while  recogniz- 
ing the  desirability  of a wage  economy,  do  not  care  to  opt 
for  it  entirely.  They  are  hopeful  that living off the  land  can 
remain  a  critical  part  of  their  welfare. K J. Rea (1968), for 
example,  has  pointed  out  the  intricacies  of  the  northern 
economy,  andthe  dilemma  for  native  peoples  when  they 
become  too  dependent  on a wage  economy. 
Legislation  governing  inland  waters,  forests, wildlife, 
land  use,  and  planning  is  necessary  to  protect  that  heritage. 
The  problem  is  that  at  present  this  responsibility lies with 
the  federal  government: 
. . . federal primacy  means that Parliament  can  always 
directly  override temtorial exercise of these  jurisdictions, 
by repealing the relevant provisions, or by legislating 
on the subject and thereby displacing the related territo- 
rial law. In contrast, in relation to the provinces, Parlia- 
ment cannot  legislate  on  subjects  over  which the provinces 
have exclusive jurisdiction, such as those set out under 
Section 92  of the BNA Act: nor can it displace  provin- 
cial  legislation in those areas where jurisdiction is con- 
current but provincial jurisdiction is paramount (Drury, 
1980:75). 
Mr.  Drury  realizes  that  this  position  is  unacceptable  to 
people in the north. They can never control their own 
destiny  until  they  have  control  over  lands  and  resources. 
A compromise  is  offered. 
The territorial government and  Council  should  assume 
increased responsibility for decisions on territorial land 
and resource use. The present federal-provincial alloca- 
tion of responsibilities in this area is not a good  model 
for the N.W.T.  The  economic  and resource potential of 
the  N.W.T., its land area relative to population, and its 
continued  fiscal dependence, create a situation in which, 
for at least the medium term, federal interests are 
necessarily greater in the N.W.T. than  they are in the 
provinces. 
Under these circumstances, the federal government 
should retain its prerogative to legislate  on the use of 
land resources in the N.W.T. in the national interest. 
For the time being, the federal government should con- 
tinue to have access  to extraordinary resource reve- 
nues in the N.W.T. so as to  ensure that all Canadians 
benefit equitably. However, it should  not  be essential 
for the federal government to retain ownership of terri- 
torial land  and resources, nor to regulate their use under 
normal circumstances. 
Crown  land  and natural resources should therefore be 
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transferred to the  N.W.T., the ultimate objective being 
full ownership of these public lands by the N.W.T. 
analogous to provincial ownership of public lands. This 
will require appropriate amendments to the N.W.T. 
Act  and the Territorial Lands Act. Until such  legisla- 
tion is  passed,  a  first  step can be taken under existing 
law: by Order-in-council, the federal government can 
transfer crown  lands to  the Commissioner for the benefi- 
cial use of the  N.W.T., although fishing  and subsurface 
rights  must  be reserved under federal control (Drury, 
1980:94). 
Suggestions  regarding  ownership of land  and  control  of 
resources obviously are among the more controversial 
parts of the Drury Report. At least two positions are 
recognized.  Federal  supremacy  now  exists in the  N.W.T. 
while  provincial  autonomy  modeled  along  lines  practised 
in  the  south  is  advocated  by  some  N.W.T.  groups.  Mr. 
Drury  goes a long  way  toward  recommending  provincial- 
type ownership and control but does not compromise 
federal access to “subsurface rights”. The transfer of 
ownership  and  control  is  to  go  to  the  N.W.T.  The  federal 
government,  however,  having  subsurface  rights,  is  enti- 
tled to a portion of the revenue taken from resource 
extraction. 
Resource  Revenue “Capping”: Territorial  revenues  from 
royalties and  other  resource r venues should be subject 
to a  “cap” beyond  which  they  would be shared with the 
federal government. The sharing formula should be 
designed so as to be neither a disincentive to responsi- 
ble resource development by the GNWT, nor a deter- 
rent to  the imposition by the GNWT of royalties, fees 
and  other levies on resource  use. It should, moreover, 
permit recovery by the GNWT of special purpose  infra- 
structure costs associated with the resource  development. 
The sharing formula should  be set out in the N.W.T. 
Act  and  should  be  based  on  an agreement between the 
federal Minister of Finance and the member of the 
Executive responsible for revenue and finance. To meet 
these requirements in an equitable way, the formula 
might  read as follows: “To the extent that  annual  resource 
revenues, in excess of agreed  infrastructure costs, exceed 
10 percent of the annual federal general purpose  grant 
to the N.W.T., the excess resource revenues shall be 
shared, respectively, between the federal and territorial 
governments on a 75:25 percentage basis” (Drury, 
1980:96). 
Drury  recognizes  the  federal  government’s  responsibil- 
ity  for  the  public  interest  (i.e.  all  Canadians).  If,  in  the 
N.W.T.,  resource  revenues  amount  to  more  than is trans- 
ferred  into  the area via  the  federal  general-purpose  grant, 
then the 75:25 formula dictates the division of excess 
revenues.  Therefore,  with  control  of  the  primary-school 
system and with a high degree of control of land and 
resources,  people  in  the  north  could be in a  position  to 
maintain  aspects  of  their  traditional  heritage. 
A second  problem  area  addressed in the  report  deals 
with  the  north’s  fiscal  dependence  on  Ottawa. 
Financial arrangements for local  and territorial govern- 
ments in the N. W.T. reflect both the existing and antici- 
pated  limited territorial tax’base. A substantial portion 
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of  net  public  funding  requirements  for  those  governments, 
more  than 80 percent  at  present,  is  met by the federal 
government  under  policies  and  practices  which  have 
evolved over the past thirty years, based on federal 
responsibilities  for  the  N.W.T.,  and  taking  into  account 
other federal fiscal priorities. This substantial fiscal 
dependence on senior governments colours virtually 
every aspect of government in the N.W.T. (Drury, 
1980:  107). 
Moreover, per-capita government expenditures in the 
N.  W.T. are  far higher than in the rest of Canada: “$5933 as 
against $2054” (Drury, 1980: 11). 
One  problem  is that at present there is  almost  no reve- 
nue base on which to build independence. In the seven 
tax-based municipalities (Fort Simpson, Frobisher Bay, 
Fort Smith,  Hay  River,  Inuvik,  Pine  Point  and  Yellowknife), 
only 64% of revenues are raised  locally (Drury , 1980: 1 17). 
Almost  half of this amount  comes  from property taxes. Of 
the remaining44 communities, classified as non-tax-based, 
no property tax is levied. In  these communities  only 12% 
of the revenue raised is  from  local sources, mostly  from 
sales taxes, licensing fees, etc. (Drury, 1980:118). The 
absence of a sound tax  base,  as in  most parts of Canada, is 
the primary reason for this dependence. 
Economic dependence should  be broken if the north  is 
to develop socially, economically and politically. To do 
this, local, regional and territorial governments must share 
in resource revenues. Such a change cannot be accom- 
plished  immediately.  As  Mr. Drury (1980:77) points out, in 
1978 revenue from resources amounted to $10 million, 
while  DINA’s  budget for  the territories was $42 million. In 
time this situation will change. Proven oil and gas reserves 
in the N.W.T. are rising, and more intense exploration 
indicates deposits of many minerals. It is very possible 
that 25% of royalties could enable fiscal independence in 
the future. The key to this possibility, however, lies  with 
the resolution of land claims. 
The Drury Report  does  address  the problem of land 
claims in Chapter 2. “The importance of claims to the 
native peoples in the N.W.T. lies in the political, eco- 
nomic and cultural benefits that may thereby be achieved” 
(17). Culturally, for example, “access to surface lands, 
water and renewable resources is essential to their tradi- 
tional pursuits of hunting, fishing and trapping . . . ” (75). 
Economically, without control of land and resources and 
corresponding revenues,  there is no possibility of fiscal 
independence. Reliance on  taxes  for revenue means that 
people in the  north would continue to be wards of the 
state.  Thus, claims are  the key to the overall development 
for indigenous peoples of the  north. 
There  is,  however, a problem  linking  land  claims and 
political  development.  By 1973, land  claims  were  recognized: 
A federal  government  policy  paper in 1973 established 
the broad lines of the federal approach. The policy 
statement  suggested that, in  exchange  for  native  inter- 
ests arising out of traditional use and occupancy of 
land,  native  peoples  would  be  compensated  by a combi- 
nation  of cash,  hunting,  fishing  and  trapping  privileges, 
resource revenue sharing, participation opportunities 
in  local  and  regional  government,  economic  opportuni- 
ties  and  fee  simple  absolute  ownership  of  certain  lands 
(Drury, 1980:16). 
And the necessity  for  political  development  was  recognized: 
In 1975, and  again  in  August 1977, the  federal  govern- 
ment  expressed  in  policy  statements  on  political  devel- 
opment  in  the  N.W.T.  that  structures  and  functions of 
government were not negotiable as part of the land 
claims.  Thus,  while  supporting  the  desirability  of  increased 
participation  and  opportunities  through  public  govern- 
ment,  such  support  was  not  intended to be  the  object  of 
claims negotiation with the native peoples. Govern- 
ment  would  not  be  negotiated  on  the  basis  of  collective 
political  rights,  nor  would  public  government  based  on 
ethnicity be acceptable to the federal government, 
Parliament,  or  to  the  Canadian  people in gen ral (Drury , 
1980:16). 
While the federal government did  not want the problems 
linked, Mr. Drury saw the importance of the connection. 
As  control  of  their  collective  destinies  cannot  be  guaran- 
teed  through  ownership  of  land alone, but must also 
include  control  of  the  decision-making processes,  the 
claims  have  become  inseparable  from the political  or 
constitutional  content  and  process  (Drury, 1980: 18). 
For native peoples, land claims and political development 
are crucial in  obtaining their overall goals. 
The final  problem to be addressed in the report is that of 
political development. Indeed, redefining  political  power 
is the raison d’etre of the  report. At the  outset  Mr. Drury 
recognized two fundamental problems. 
While  opinions  differ  widely  on the form  which  govern- 
ment  should  take  in  the  N.W.T.,  most  residents in the 
Territories  consider  the  current  state of government  to 
be  unsatisfactory  (Drury, 1980:29). 
Generally, it  is  agreed that political change is essential. 
Second, while the direction of change is  not clear,  the goal 
should be to make government responsive to the  “needs 
and  concerns of the people” (Drury, 1980:39). 
The  fundamental  criticism  levelled  against  government 
in  the  N.W.T.  is  that  it  is  neither “by the people”  nor 
“of  the  people” and, therefore,  is unlikely to be “for 
the  people.”  Both  the  authority  and  responsibility  for 
government,  it is argued,  still  rest  almost  entirely in the 
hands  of  the  federal  government.  Despite  certain  trap- 
pings of self-government that have been won by the 
residents of  the  North,  most  northerners  feel  that they 
still  are  being  administered  from  afar  as  contemporary 
colony  of  Canada. 
The  sense  of frustration, which  arises  from  this  inability 
to  control  their  own  affairs,  is  felt as strongly in the 50 
communities  spread  throughout  the 1.3 million  square 
miles  as it is in Yellowknife.  This  frustration  underlies 
the many  proposals put forward  for  constitutional  change 
(Drury, 1980:29). 
The  problem  of  political  power  is one of the anomalies 
of the north.  For almost a decade,  there has been much 
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talk of devolving  power to the people. Indeed, institutional 
structures have been created at the local, regional and 
territorial levels whereby people select their political 
representatives. Nevertheless, all theinstitutionalarrange- 
ments in the world cannot hide the fact that Ottawa rules. 
The federal government, under existing statutes, retains 
ultimate authority in the N.W.T.  This fact is a source of 
irritation to residents of the Territories. They do not accept 
the fact that they  have elected representative institutions, 
yet  no  political  power. The latter is  what  they see as their 
due and  they are determined to achieve it by constitutional 
change. 
Designing a new and better arrangement might seem  an 
easy task  in constitutional engineering.  Basic  powers  could 
be  divided  between  levels of government. As mentioned, 
however, the stakes are high. The federal government 
does not  intend to surrender totally its access to a poten- 
tially  large revenue source. And people of the  north  have 
no  intention of remaining under Ottawa’s control. What 
then  is the solution to the polarity of these two  positions? 
Drury  initially states emphatically  that  he  is  not advocat- 
ing provincial status: 
This  Report does not set out either the timing or the 
conditions for achieving  provincial status in the N. W.T. 
Nor  do the conclusions prescribe a provincial  model or 
any other precise model ofgovernment  (Drury, 1980:4). 
He  goes  on to give  his reasons for this stance: 
. . . the alternatives in structures ofgovernment and the 
discrepancies in the boundaries  proposed lead to the 
following questions: which alternatives will most  effec- 
tively strengthen  government and best serve the inter- 
ests of the people  within the N.W.T.; which  will  give 
greater political autonomy, greater strength to resist the 
gravitational forces of southern  Canada, and  maintain 
equitable representation of the N.W.T. or its parts in 
the federal-provincial balance of power? To maintain 
the level of political  autonomy desired in the N.W.T., 
any  eventual  province or provinces must themselves 
have the internal political  and  economic infra-structure 
for endurance.  The risk otherwise is substitution of the 
current  dependency, federal or territorial, for another 
dependency, in the form of increased federal, provincial, 
international or  other external accountability. 
The  conclusions  that follow in this Report will support  a 
united N.W.T.  They  argue for changes in the federal, 
territorial and  community processes and structures of 
government, designed to promote  increased representa- 
tion, accountability and responsiveness of government 
throughout the N.W.T. (Drury, 1980:12). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1faunitedN.W.T.  isadvocated, how  should  powers  within 
be altered to achieve better representation, accountability 
and responsiveness? A first priority is government at the 
local or “community” level as it  is  called  in  the report. In 
this vast area where settlements are remote, the  commu- 
nity  is the central organization for the people. Both  Mr. 
Carrothers and Mr. Drury realized that the self-reliant 
indigenous  people  were  traditionally  suspicious of  resigning 
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their fate to distant, higher  levels of government. The  role 
of local government was more relevant in their lives. 
Therefore, if adegree of self-sufficiency  was to be realized, 
the role of elected community organizations would  have to 
be adapted accordingly. 
Unfortunately, community government is viewed by 
officials in the north as it is in the south. Mr. Drury 
(1980:49) outlines the problem. 
Both the territorial and federal governments view  the 
institutions oflocal government as administrative exten- 
sions of the senior levels. The local councils and  com- 
mittees are treated, by and large, as agents for the 
delivery of a number of territorially or federally pre- 
scribed programs and services. The structures created 
within  the  communities,  the  linkages  established  between 
the levels of government, and the type of interaction 
and communication flowing between the levels have 
been  designed  by the senior levels almost  exclusively  to 
meet their particular objectives and priorities. Such  an 
approach, because it lacks a local focus, is counter- 
productive to the development of a strong autonomous 
local level of government. It is important that both 
senior levels of government  develop the attitude and 
practice of considering community councils as clients 
to be served and supported. 
The problem exists not only  with  officials  but also with 
the people. The anomaly of the north is  very  real  at  the 
community  level: 
. . . the same phenomenon occurs at the community 
level as at the territorial level: despite the existence of 
fully elected representative bodies, there is a  sense of 
powerlessness and a feeling that government  is  being 
“administered” from afar (Drury, 1980:34). 
The present role of community councils does nothing to 
alter this sense of powerlessness. 
The  current jurisdictional areas of municipal councils 
relate primarily to  the physical  operation of hard ser- 
vices and include services such as water, sewerage, 
garbage collection, road maintenance, zoning  and  com- 
munity  planning. The soft services, namely  social  and 
cultural matters, education and  land  management, are 
largely excluded from the local process of decision- 
making. Many residents of the smaller communities 
regard the soft services as being critical to their lives, 
but ones over which they have little influence. In 
particular, there is concern that land-based cultural 
values and the local focus on hunting, trapping and 
fishing are in jeopardy  because of externally-imposed 
decisions on land use in the vicinity of these communi- 
ties (Drury, 1980:35-36). 
Mr. Drury’s design (1980:42) would  change the role: 
The suggestions  made here are designed to strengthen 
community government in the N.W.T. by increasing 
political authority and responsibility at the local  level. 
For  a  number of reasons, movement in this direction is 
necessary  and,  indeed, crucial to political  development 
in the N.W.T. 
These reasons include: a natural community orientation in 
the culture; anatural community orientation in the environ- 
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ment; the development of political and administrative 
experience; and a check on higher  levels of government 
(Drury, 1980:42).  With thisjustification, the place commu- 
nity organizations have in the governing  of the N.W.T.  is 
altered significantly. 
The territorial and federal governments should  recog- 
nize  a real and distinct first tier of government at  the 
local  level.  At such time as the N.W.T. Act  is revised, 
an article should  be added that would  explicitly  recog- 
nize the municipal order of government in the N.W.T. 
and specify those jurisdictions in  which the communi- 
ties would  haveparamount  authority [italics added].  Com- 
munities  should, however, be permitted to choose to 
exercise  such  responsibilities as they  feel  ready to accept. 
The N.W.T. Act should also permit communities to 
delegate any of their responsibilities to regional struc- 
tures (Drury, 1980:43). 
Addedjurisdictional  responsibilities for community  coun- 
cils cover land  and resource management, education, social 
programming  and  housing (Drury, 1980:43-47).  Lands  around 
the community  would  be  divided into two categories. Com- 
munity “boundaries” would include lands immediately 
surrounding the community site. Legal possession of these 
lands  would  include the responsibilities of ownership and 
control, exercised by councils. The size  of these bounda- 
ries  would depend on community size, services provided 
and  anticipated  growth.  At  the  time the r port  was  published, 
15  of 5 1 communities had  formalized  community  bounda- 
ries through the Block Land  Transfer program, and Mr. 
Drury suggests all communities determine community 
boundaries. Administrative and by-law authority andjuris- 
diction of boundary lands should  be the responsibility of 
community councils and  these procedures would no longer 
require GN WT approval. 
A second category includes specific lands beyond  com- 
munity boundaries. These lands would be designated a 
community’s “sphere of influence”. 
If requested by a community  council,  senior  levels of 
government  should  commence  discussions  with the coun- 
cil  with the object of delineating an area outside the 
community boundary to be designated as that com- 
.’munity’s sphere of influence. The  area  set  aside  as  the 
sphere of influence  should  be  defined  according to the 
community’s  need to protect its interests. Matters or 
activities that are  to be the subject of joint discussions 
should be identified. Such items as surface land use 
within  the  area,  regional  planning  and  renewable  resource 
management  would appear to be appropriate elements 
for  joint regulation and management. 
The boundaries of the spheres of  influence, the activi- 
ties of joint  interest  and  the d cision-making processes 
should  be  formalized  in  participation  agreements  between 
the appropriate levels of government (Drury, 1980:44). 
In a sense, communities in the north would become 
almost  like  Greek city-states. Lands immediately around 
the city would be governed by local authorities; lands 
surrounding the city-state, i.e.  enough  land to make the 
city-state self-sufficient,  would  be under the jurisdiction 
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of the city-state. The difference, of course, is that the 
communities  in the north are not “sovereign”. They  remain 
within the jurisdiction of Canada,  as would any province 
or municipality. 
Another important jurisdiction pertains to education. 
As  already  pointed out, educational responsibilities  would 
fall between community councils and the territorial 
government. The responsibility for primary  education would 
be an additional function for community  councils. 
Services considered most important to residents of com- 
munities - social programs and housing - would be 
transferred to community councils. In his report Mr. Drury 
conveys  the feeling that communities can probably  best 
decide the  scope and direction of these services. 
Community government should  be  able torespond  more 
effectively and responsibly to the social  needs of their 
communities  within a context that acknowledges the 
continuing federal and territorialresponsibilities. Social 
measures that are part of national programs should 
remain  within the  jurisdiction of the federal or  territo- 
rial governments. These would  include  payments such 
as family  allowances,  unemployment  benefits  and  old 
age  pensions. The GNWT should  retain  paramountcy 
in the fields of social assistance, child  welfare  and cor- 
rectional  services  where temtorial standards  are  required 
or where there is an interface  with the judicial  system. 
However, the GNWT should adopt an active role in 
developing a process for the decentralization of the 
management of these programs to community  govern- 
ments at an appropriate time. 
In all other areas of social  programming  and  planning, 
the community order of government  should have the 
option to assume  full  responsibility for community  social 
programs or  to request the GNWT to continue  provid- 
ing the  services. 
Financial arrangements for social services  for which 
the community is responsible  should  permit  local alloca- 
tion of funds among  various priorities. The overall  level 
of funds available to the community for  these purposes 
should  eventually  be determined by formula financing. 
This is  further discussed under the financing of commu- 
nity governments in chapter 6. 
In  the  areas where the  GNWT  retains ultimate  responsi- 
bility, such as social assistance or child  welfare,  but the 
community opts  to take on responsibility for program 
delivery, funds should  be  provided  by the GNWT to the 
community  through  specific purposegrants. The associ- 
ated administrative and financial arrangements should 
be  formalized  in agreements setting out the responsibili- 
ties and commitments of each government, and  should 
be signed  by the chairman of the community  council 
and  the  designated  Executive  Committee  member  (Drury, 
1980:46). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Responsibility  for  services  would  be  ajoint  endeavor  between 
community  councils  and  GNWT.  Communities  would  have 
the option of assuming a greater role in the delivery of 
services. Financing, according to Drury, would remain 
the responsibility of the GNWT. 
For people in the  north, viable government at  the com- 
munity  level  is  synonymous  with  gaining control of their 
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own affairs, Native people argue they can best solve  local 
problems at the local  level. Mr. Drury  goes a long  way in 
suggesting decentralization of responsibilities to com- 
munities.  In fact, the GNWT  is  committed to devolution, 
and an interesting experiment is on trial in Fort Good 
Hope. Also  in  many  communities  more  educational instruc- 
tion is done in the native  language. 
Increased jurisdictions for community councils would 
in effect  grant them  “paramount authority” in  specified 
areas. This  change  is one of the more  innovative  sugges- 
tions made in the Drury Report and does not  follow  the 
model  of  provincial-municipal  power  arrangements  in  south- 
ern Canada. In fact, the suggestions are  a real departure 
from tradition in the Canadian experience. Municipal  gov- 
ernments  have  not  enjoyed aparticular constitutional status. 
Rather, they are considered “creatures of the provinces.” 
Their  legal  and fiscal capabilities are determined by provin- 
cial charter. Should a change  like this be  implemented, it 
would  offer  people  in the communities  an opportunity to 
control many of the affairs they consider essential in their 
lives. 
Political changes are suggested for other levels of 
government. Regional councils, for example, could be 
formed if communities in a designated region opt for them. 
In terms ofjurisdictions, they  would  function  somewhere 
between community councils and the GNWT. Specific 
responsibilities, such as regional  planning,  regulatory  and 
administrative functions and responsibility for regional 
institutions, could be assigned to these councils (Drury 
198053). One  regional  entity  now exists, the Bafin Regional 
Council, and one is proposed by COPE, the Western 
Arctic  Regional  Municipality (WARM). The role of these 
organizations is  still  evolving  but there seems  to be a place 
for them in the political  design.  They  would operate as 
loose confederations of local  communities. 
The GNWT  would  undergo a significant transition. Basic 
powers of the  federal  government,  exercised  through  DINA, 
the Commissioner and the Executive, would be trans- 
ferred to the Territorial Council and its Executive (Drury, 
According to Drury, however, the office of the Commis- 
sioner would  not  be abolished. “Ultimately, the Commis- 
sioner’s  position  should  evolve to the more  formal  role of a 
contemporary lieutenant governor” (57). This  evolution 
would take place when the territorial government “has 
achieved greater certainty with respect to revenues and 
the process of devolution to the local  community  has  been 
firmly set in train. . . , ” (57). 
The Executive Committee is now made up of the 
Commissioner,  Deputy  Commissioner,  twoappointed  mem- 
bers and three to seven members of the elected Territorial 
Council. Gradually, elected members of the  Council  would 
“assume the formal  and actual burden of government in 
the N.W.T.” (61). The Executive would then consist of 
elected members  and function as a cabinet, with  members 
1980~49-52, 55, 57-68). 
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holding  GNWT portfolios. Responsibility of the Execu- 
tive would  be to the Territorial Council. 
The Territorial Council  would function as the legislative 
body of the N.W.T. Currently, 22 members are elected 
from constituencies throughout the Territories. As respon- 
sibilities are taken from the federal government,  they  would 
be assumed by the Council. The federal government’s 
shadow  would  remain  in terms of its entitlement to  a share 
of resource revenue. And, as it does in other parts of 
Canada, it  would exercise federal responsibilities under 
the BNA Act (now the Canada Act), e.g. defence. The 
GNWT, regions  and  communities  would  then  divide  respon- 
sibilities accordingly. Thus, in time the GNWT would 
come  very close to functioning  like a province. 
A final  change in the existing structure affects the Minis- 
terial portfolio. Responsibility for the N.W.T.  now  falls to 
the Minister of Indian and  Northern Affairs.  Mr.  Drury 
(198059, 90) suggests that this responsibility be trans- 
ferred to  a  proposed federal Minister of State for Federal- 
Provincial-Territorial Relations. The change, Drury feels, 
“should facilitate the change in the federal approach  to an 
inter-governmental relationship with the GNWT.”  Func- 
tions now under DINA would  be dispersed to ministers 
responsible for all of Canada, e.g. health services, housing, 
etc. In addition, a new  Ministry for Native Peoples  would 
be  formed to “represent the interest of the native  people in 
the Canadianconstitutional forum” (138). With exceptions, 
the N.  W.T.  should  be equal to provinces in its  relationship 
with the federal government. 
I11 
The Drury Report cannot be characterized as a radical 
document. In fact, many  people  in the N.W.T.  are apt to 
dismiss it as merely areflection of the federal government’s 
interest. Indeed, there is little in the report with which 
Ottawa might argue. No compelling  time  frame  is  offered 
for constitutional change; no  suggestion is madeforprovin- 
cia1 status that would jeopardize disposition of resource 
revenues; no structural changes are put forth which can- 
not be accommodated within the Canada Act; and no 
change  is advocated for altering  existing  geographic  and 
political boundaries. Other than phasing out absolute con- 
trol in the region, the only  real loss to  Ottawa would  be 
25% of resource revenues. 
This, of course, would  not  be a net  loss for the federal 
government. The territorial portion of resource revenue 
would begin to accrue after Ottawa had been repaid a 
portion of the general-purpose grant, i.e. the federal 
government’s special grant to the GNWT to maintain 
services. Therefore, by  giving  up access to  a quarter of 
resource revenues in the N.W.T.,  Ottawa could achieve 
two objectives. The financial burden of supporting the 
GNWT would be removed. The GNWT could become 
financially independent without having to rely on property 
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or transaction taxes. While  accomplishing these objectives, 
Ottawa would retain 75% of resource revenues for  the 
public purse. 
Although the report is favorable to Ottawa’s position, 
should  it be dismissed  by people in the  N.W.T.?  In  fact, 
the report contains significant  suggestions  which  could  be 
used by groups in the area as they pull together their 
arguments for constitutional change. First, it  suggests that 
a portion of resource revenues accrue to the GNWT. 
While the 75:25 formula will not please all individuals, two 
factors must  be considered. As  Mr.  Drury notes,  the fed- 
eral government will never surrender all  rights in the  area. 
In the name of the “public interest” a share of resource 
revenues must go to  the Canadian treasury. Territorial 
resources, then, would  be  shared  by  residents ofthe N.W.T. 
and the people of Canada. 
Development  of resources in the region  is  only  beginning. 
Technology  now exists which  makes  extraction of resources 
in the north feasible. As world  supplies  diminish and prices 
rise, development of these resources from one-third of the 
surface area of Canada may  become one of our largest 
industries. Therefore,  the 25% cut must be seen in terms of 
its  potential. In time, this revenue might  more than free  the 
N.W.T. of fiscal dependence on Ottawa. As a model for 
resolving claims, such an agreement might  avoid  some of 
the pitfalls now evident in the James Bay and Alaska 
settlements. Unlike a cash  settlement, revenue would  con- 
tinue to be generated as long as  resources were extracted. 
Secondly,  the Drury Report suggests  increasing  signifi- 
cantly the role of  community councils. If the report is  used 
as a blueprint, elected community councils would have 
control of their primary educational system, control of 
community lands, authority in  management of “spheres of 
influence”, and control of essential services. This shift in 
responsibilities  may  not appear  dramatic, but is  consid- 
ered essential by people whose  primary orientation is the 
local community. 
The third positive change is an actual decentralization 
of power  from Ottawa to  the GNWT. For example, the 
transfer of power  from the Commissioner and his Execu- 
tive to the elected Council and its Executive would be 
devolution. In fact, the GNWT has started devolution. 
Many administrative duties and responsibilities of the 
Commissioner’s  office have been delegated to the Territo- 
rial Legislature and Cabinet. 
While the  above suggestions are positive, they do not 
answer all the criticisms and concerns of people in the 
N.W.T. today. At least three major issues remain to be 
addressed by the federal government. First, Ottawa has 
not responded officially to the Drury Report. After  more 
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than two years there has been neither endorsement nor 
rejection of Drury’s  suggestions.  While events important 
to people in the north continue to  occur,  the federal govern- 
ment has made no move to alter  the constitutional arrange- 
mentfor  the GNWT. The silence on this issue  is  deafening. 
Secondly, the GNWT has embarked on a policy of 
devolution. In  fact,  the N.W.T. now has a cabinet and 
legislature, and powers of the Commissioner have been 
transferred. This is a de facto change. Legally, the federal 
government has made no move to formalize a new process. 
One cannot help but question whether the government will 
tolerate change to a point and then draw the line, or 
whether a continuous  evolutionary  process will  be permitted. 
The problem could spark a serious constitutional con- 
frontation. 
And finally, the federal government continues to pass 
important  pieces of legislation  affecting  people in the  N . W  .T. 
Bill  C-48 is an example. Many residents of the N.W.T.  feel 
that the way in  which resources  are developed is as impor- 
tant as the revenue from development. Therefore, the 
question is whether individuals and groups in the N.W.T. 
will have an opportunity to express their views on the 
nature of developmental property. Devising a process by 
which inputs could  be  formalized  is an important issue for 
many residents of the N.W.T.  Action on this problem  is 
needed before the guidelines for resource development are 
established. 
Indeed,  the  absence of a federal response to  the Drury 
Report is conspicuous. Ottawa must clarify its position 
before events continue to overtake the situation. 
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